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1  Introduction
Since Milsark (1979) and Carlson (1980), it has been well known that there are 
two types of predicates in natural languages: stage-level predicates and individu-
al-level predicates (SLPs and ILPs). Intuitively speaking, the former denote a 
transient property, while the latter denote a permanent property. The notable 
difference between them lies in their (in)compatibility with adverbs of quantifi-
cation (Q-adverbs) such as itumo ‘always’:
(1) a.  Itumo Taro-wa genki-da.
   always Taro-Top fine-Cop
   “Always, Taro is fine.” (SLP)
 b. ＊ Itumo Taro-wa nihonzin-da.
   always Taro-Top Japanese-Cop
   “Always, Taro is Japanese.” (ILP)
The contrast between (1a) and (1b) indicates that SLPs such as genki-da ‘be fine’ 
can be used with Q-adverbs but ILPs such as nihonzin-da ‘be Japanese’ cannot. 
On the basis of this data, many researchers such as Diesing (1992) and Kratzer 
(1995) claim that SLPs and ILPs have different argument structures.
There are, however, unnoticed data that cause several problems to the anal-
yses in favor of this view. Consider the example with the focus particle dake 
65
‘only’:
(2) a. Context A
   Taro is an international business person, and he moves from country 
to country. We are talking about his life in a foreign country and how 
many Japanese people there are around him.
 b. Itumo Taro-dake-ga nihonzin-da.
  always Taro-DAKE-Nom Japanese-Cop
  “Always, only Taro is Japanese.”
From this data we can see that if the focus particle is added to a sentence with an 
ILP and a Q-adverb, the resulting sentence becomes acceptable.2) As shown be-
low, however, the focus particle loses the rescuing effect in another context:
(3) a. Context B
   Taro got an MBA at an international business school. While he was at 
the school, he shared a house with three students, Alex, Chris and 
Dave. All of them are from the US. They decided to hold a reunion 
every two years after they graduated. They promised not to gather 
when any one of them cannot attend.
 b. ＊ (Dousoukai-o suru toki-wa,) itumo Taro-dake-ga nihonzin-da.
   reunion-Acc hold when-Top, always Taro-DAKE-NOM Japanese-Cop
   “(When they hold a reunion,) always only Taro is Japanese.” 
At this point, the following question arises:
(4)  Why does the focus particle dake have a rescuing effect in appropriate con-
texts?
In this paper I argue against Kratzer’s (1995) analysis in light of the new data and 
answer this question by utilizing a contextual variable (von Fintel (1994) and 
Martí (2003)), which is needed to derive an adequate truth condition of a sen-
tence with dake.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, I will review Kratzer 
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(1995) and point out the problems therein. In section 3, I will propose an alter-
native analysis and section 4 will conclude this paper.
2  Review of Kratzer (1995) and the Problems
In this section I will review Kratzer (1995) as a representative of the analyses 
based on the view that SLPs and ILPs have different argument structures and 
point out that her analysis faces two problems in analyzing the examples with 
dake. After that, I will present the desiderata for an adequate analysis of the new 
data.
2.1  Kratzer (1995): Difference in Argument Structure
As a constraint on quantifiers in general, Kratzer (1995) proposes the constraint 
in (5):
(5)  Prohibition against Vacuous Quantification (Kratzer 1995:131) 
  For every quantifier Q, there must be a variable x such that Q binds an oc-
currence of x in both its restrictive clause and its nuclear scope.
Simply put, the above constraint says that there must be a variable for Q-adverbs 
to bind.
In addition, Kratzer (1995) argues that SLPs and ILPs have different argu-
ment structures as in (6):
(6)  SLPs and ILPs differ in their argument structures: only the former have an 
event argument.
Under this analysis, the argument structures of the SLP genki-da and the ILP ni-
honzin-da are represented as follows:
(7) a. genki-da: < event, theme >
 b. nihonzin-da: < theme >
The important thing for the following discussion is that only SLPs have an event 
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variable for Q-adverbs to bind.
Given these ideas, the LFs of (1a) and (1b) are represented as in (8), where 
the letter e stands for an event variable and the letter C for some contextually de-
termined information:  3)
(8) a.  LF of (1a)
   Alwayse [C (Taro, e)] [fine (Taro, e)]
 b.  LF of (1b)
  ＊ Alwayse [C (Taro, e)] [Japanese (Taro)]
In (8a), the predicate genki-da is an SLP, and the Q-adverb can bind event varia-
bles in both its restrictor and its nuclear scope. Therefore, (1a) does not violate 
the constraint above and is correctly predicted to be acceptable. In (8b), on the 
other hand, there is no event variable in the nuclear scope, since the predicate is 
an ILP. This example violates the constraint in (5), resulting in its unacceptabili-
ty. In this way, Kratzer’s (1995) analysis captures the incompatibility of ILPs with 
Q-adverbs.
2.2  Arguments against Kratzer’s (1995) analysis
As is clear from the analysis of (1a) and (1b), the distribution of Q-adverbs heav-
ily depends on the presence or absence of variables. Therefore, her analysis 
makes the prediction in (9):
(9)  If a sentence with a Q-adverb is acceptable, there must be a bindable varia-
ble.
With this prediction in mind, let us turn to the new data presented in section 1. 
Recall that if we add the focus particle to a sentence with an ILP and a Q-adverb, 
the sentence becomes acceptable in the appropriate context (=(2b)). Given (9), 
the example in (2b) should have (10b) as its LF:
(10) a. Itumo Taro-dake-ga nihonzin-da. (=(2b))
 b. Alwayse [C (John, e)] [Japanese (Taro-dake, e)]
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In (10b), the predicate nihonzin-da has an event variable and the Q-adverb binds 
the event variable in both its restrictive clause and nuclear scope. Since the dif-
ference between (1b) and (2b) lies in the existence of dake, we have to assume 
that the focus particle triggers an operation like (11) to derive the LF representa-
tion presented above:
(11) The Operation Trigged by dake
  The focus particle dake changes ILPs into SLPs that contain an event ar-
gument in their argument structures.
If we assume that dake behaves as in (11), the predicate nihonzin-da in (2b) is 
turned into an SLP with an event variable and thus the vacuous quantification 
should be avoided. Kratzer’s (1995) analysis therefore seems to capture the fact 
that (2b) is acceptable. There are, however, at least two problems in this analysis, 
to which we will turn now.
2.2.1  Problem 1: Strangeness of (11)
To introduce the first problem, let us consider a coercive phenomenon where an 
ILP is reinterpreted as an SLP in a suitable context:
(12) a. Context
   A strange law is enforced in Japan and people there can change their 
nationalities every day.
 b. Itumo Taro-wa nihonzin-da
  always Taro-Top Japanese-Cop.
  “Always, Taro is Japanese.“
The predicate nihonzin-da is interpreted as an ILP when it is used out of the 
blue. As shown in (12b), however, if we set up a suitable context, the same predi-
cate is reinterpreted as an SLP and becomes compatible with Q-adverbs. Given 
this fact, it is not a surprise that dake can trigger the operation in (11).
However, the characteristic property of coercive phenomena is that the re-
interpreted predicate denotes a transient property (i.e., in the above case, one’s 
nationality can change every day). Therefore, before accepting (11), we should 
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test the prediction below:
(13)  If dake changes an ILP into an SLP with an event variable, the resulting 
predicate should denote a transient property in some sense.
To see whether this prediction is correct, let us begin with considering the intui-
tive meaning of a sentence with dake:
(14) a. Taro-dake-ga nihonzin-da.
  Taro-DAKE-Nom Japanese-Cop
  “Only Taro is Japanese.”
 b. Intuitive Meaning
  Taro is Japanese and no one but Taro is Japanese
Intuitively, (14a) conveys the meaning in (14b). Note that the predicates nihon-
zin-da in (14b) do not denote a transient property as in (12). Moreover, as 
shown below, the particle dake presupposes that its prejacent (i.e., the left con-
junct of (14b)) is true:
(15) a. Question
  Taro-dake-ga nihonzin-desu-ka?
  Taro-DAKE-Nom Japanese-Cop-Q
  “Is only Taro Japanese?”
 b. Conditional
  Taro-deke-ga nihonzin-na-ra, kare-wa sabisii-da-rou.
  Taro-DAKE-Nom Japanese-Cop-if he-Top lonely-Cop-will
  If only Taro is Japanese, he will be lonely.
In the above examples, the truth of the proposition Taro-wa nihonzin-da is kept 
intact under the question and the conditional. This is one of the characteristics 
of presuppositional meaning.4) From these observations, we can conclude that 
the predicate nihonzin-da, when used with dake, does not denote a transient 
property. This means that the above prediction is not correct, and the operation 
trigged by dake is strange in that the resulting predicate with an event argument 
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does not denote a transient property in any sense.
2.2.2  Problem 2: Two Types of dake
As shown above, Kratzer’s (1995) analysis has to assume that the particle dake 
triggers a strange operation. In addition, even if we admit that operation, there 
remains another problem. Recall that in Context B, the existence of dake does 
not enable the ILP to be used with the Q-adverb:
(3) a.  Context B
    Taro got an MBA at an international business school. While he was at 
the school, he shared a house with three students, Alex, Chris and 
Dave. All of them are from the US. They decided to hold a reunion 
every two years after they graduated. They promised not to gather 
when any one of them cannot attend.
 b. ＊ (Dousoukai-o suru toki-wa,) itumo Taro-dake-ga nihonzin-da.
The unacceptability of this example forces us to admit the existence of two types 
of dake: one that can supply an event argument and another that cannot. This is 
too ad hoc, and Kratzer’s (1995) analysis, therefore, lacks explanatory power.
2.3  Interim Summary and Desiderata
In this section, I reviewed Kratzer’s (1995) analysis and pointed out two prob-
lems, which are summarized below:
(16) a. Problem 1: Strangeness of (11)
   The operation in (11) is strange in that it changes an ILP into an SLP 
with an event variable but the resulting predicate does not express a 
transient property.
 b. Problem 2: Two Types of dake
   We are forced to admit the existence of two types of dake: one that 
can trigger the operation in (11) and another that cannot.
These problems arise because in her analysis, SLPs and ILPs have different 
argument structures and Q-adverbs are sensitive to the presence or absence of 
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variables. In order to account for the new data, we need an analysis based on (i) 
a new characterization of SLPs and ILPs, (ii) a way to capture the difference of 
dake between Context A and Context B, and (iii) a constraint on Q-adverbs that 
does not resort to bindable variables. In what follows I will discuss these desid-
erata in this order and propose an alternative analysis.
3  Proposal
3.1  A New Characterization of SLPs and ILPs
First, I assume that both SLPs and ILPs have time arguments denoting time in-
tervals of type i:
(17) a.  genki-da  = λx.λt. x is fine at t 〈e,〈i, t〉〉
 b.  nihonzin-da  = λx.λt. x is Japanese at t 〈e,〈i, t〉〉
These predicates have no difference in argument structure, so we need another 
way to differentiate these predicates. To this end, I propose that ILPs denote a 
kind of constant function defined as in (18):
(18)  A function f of type 〈e,〈i, t〉〉 is an individual-level predicate iff ∀x∀t∀t′
[ f (x)(t) = f (x)(t′)]
According to (18), ILPs, once they take an individual argument, return the same 
value (“true” or “false”) regardless of what time argument they take.
To make the point, consider the following three possibilities:
(19) a. Possibility 1
  [λt. Taro is Japanese at t](t1) = 1 [λt. Taro is Japanese at t](t2) = 1 [λt. Taro is Japanese at t](t3) = 1
 b. Possibility 2
  [λt. Taro is Japanese at t](t1) = 0 [λt. Taro is Japanese at t](t2) = 0 [λt. Taro is Japanese at t](t3) = 0
 c. ＊ Possibility 3
  [λt. Taro is Japanese at t](t1) = 1 [λt. Taro is Japanese at t](t2) = 0 [λt. Taro is Japanese at t](t3) = 1
In (19a) and (19b) the predicate nihonzin-da returns the same values regardless 
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of time arguments. This means that Taro’s nationality is constant across time in-
tervals and in this sense, the predicate denotes a permanent property. In (19c), 
on the other hand, the predicate returns different values across different time in-
tervals, which means that Taro’s nationality changes across time intervals and 
the predicate denotes a transient property. Thanks to (18), (19c) is ruled out and 
we can capture the fact that ILPs denote a permanent property without resorting 
to the difference in argument structure.
3.2  The Semantics of dake
Following Rooth’s (1985) analysis of the focus particle only, I assume that the fo-
cus particle dake has two meaning contents: a negative universal and a presup-
position.5)  In what follows, I use the ∂-operator proposed in Beaver (2001) to 
represent a presuppositional content: the formula Φ in ∂(Φ) denotes a presup-
positional content. A lexical entry for dake based on this idea is given in (20):
(20)  dake  = λx.λP〈e,〈i, t〉〉.λt. ∂(P(x)(t)) ∧ ∀y[y ≠ x → ¬P(y)(t) ]
   Presupposition Assertion
 (based on Rooth (1985))
Let me illustrate how this lexical entry derives the truth condition of a sentence 
with dake:
(21) a. Taro-dake-ga nihonzin-da.
 b.  (21a) 
  =  dake  (  Taro  ) (  nihonzin  )
  = λt.∂ (Taro is Japanese at t) ∧ ∀y[y ≠ Taro → y is not Japanese at t]
 c.  (21a) is defined at t only if Taro is Japanese at t (Presupposition). If 
defined, it is true at t iff for every y, if y is not Taro, y is not Japanese 
at t (Assertion).
The focus particle dake takes two arguments, Taro and nihonzin-da, and returns 
the proposition in (21b). There is, however, a problem in this analysis. Note the 
underlined part in (21c). The universal quantifier quantifies over non-restricted 
individuals, which leads to a strong truth condition requiring that there is no 
⎧ ｜ ⎨ ｜ ⎩ ⎧ ｜ ｜ ｜ ｜ ⎨ ｜ ｜ ｜ ｜ ⎩
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Japanese other than Taro in the world.
To solve this problem, I use a contextual variable C, which has been pro-
posed to analyze the phenomenon called a quantifier domain restriction (see 
von Fintel (1994) and Martí (2003)), and assume that dake takes this variable as 
its first argument, as shown below:  6)
(22)   dake  = λC〈e,〈i, t〉〉.λx.λP.λt. ∂(P(x)(t)) ∧ ∀y[C(y)(t) ∧ y ≠ x → ¬P(y)(t)]
If (21a) is uttered in the context in (23a), this revised lexical entry gives us the 
truth condition in (23d):
(23) a. Context
  We are talking about the nationalities of the people in this room
 b. Simplified LF of (21a)
  [[[Taro] [ dakec1 ]] [ nihonzin-da ]]
 c. g: = [1 → λx.λt. x is a person in this room at t]
 d. (21a)  g
  =  dake  g (  C1  g ) (  Taro  g ) (  nihonzin  g )
   = λt.∂(Taro is Japanese at t) ∧ ∀y[ g(C1)(y)(t) ∧ y ≠ Taro → y is not 
Japanese at t]
   = λt.∂(Taro is Japanese at t) ∧ ∀y[y is a person in this room at t ∧ 
y ≠Taro→ y is not Japanese at t]
 e.  (21a) is defined at t if Taro is Japanese at t. If defined, it is true at t iff 
for every y such that y is a person in this room at t and y is not Taro, 
then y is not Japanese at t.
The contextual variable C1 is assigned to the value in (23c) by the assignment 
function g. The particle dake takes C1, Taro, and nihonzin-da, and the result is 
(23d). This truth condition requires that there is no Japanese other than Taro in 
this room. Thanks to the existence of this contextual variable, the universal 
quantification in the assertive part is over the people in this room who are not 
Taro and the adequate truth condition is derived.
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3.3  A Variable-Free Constraint on Q-adverbs
Following Stump (1985), I assume that Q-adverbs are generalized quantifiers 
over sets of time intervals:
(24)  itumo  g = λp〈i, t〉.λq〈i, t〉.λt.∀t′[t′ ≤ t ∧ p(t′) → q(t′) ]
 (based on Stump (1985))
In addition, I assume that in the absence of explicit restrictors, Q-adverbs take 
as their first argument a contextual variable of type 〈i, t〉, whose value is deter-
mined by an assignment function g.
To illustrate, let us consider a sentence with a Q-adverb. Suppose that (25b) 
is uttered in the context where we are talking about what Taro does in his free 
time. The lexical entry in (24) derives the truth condition in (25e):
(25) a. Context: We are talking about what Taro does in his free time.
 b. Itumo Taro-wa LGB-o yomu.
  always Taro-Top LGB-Acc read
  “Always, Taro reads LGB.”
 c. g:= [ 1 → λt. Taro is free at t] 
 d.  (25b)  g
  =  itumo  g (  C1  g ) (  Tar-wa LGB-o yomu  g )
  = λt.∀t′[t′≤ t ∧ g(C1)(t′) → Taro reads LGB at t′]
  = λt.∀t′[t′≤ t ∧ Taro is free at t′→ Taro reads LGB at t′]
 e.  (25b) is true at t iff for every t′ such that t′ is a subinterval of t and 
Taro is free at t′, Taro reads LGB at t′.
The Q-adverb itumo takes two propositions, C1, whose value is determined as in 
(25c), and the proposition that Taro reads LGB. The result is (25e), which says 
that (25b) is true iff for every subinterval t′ of t, both of these propositions hold.
Note that in the current analysis, vacuous quantification never happens, 
since ILPs as well as SLPs have time arguments and Q-adverbs can bind varia-
bles in any case. We therefore need another constraint on Q-adverbs that does 
not resort to the presence or absence of bindable variables. For this purpose, I 
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adopt Percus’s (2007) pragmatic constraint on Q-adverbs:
(26)  Let Q be the relevant kind of generalized quantifier and A, B two sets. 
Then the statement Q A B is pragmatically deviant in a common ground 
CG if there is a proper subset A′ of A such that CG |= Q(A)(B) ⇔ Q(A′)(B).
 (Percus 2007:210)
The above constraint says that the use of Q-adverbs is banned under the follow-
ing condition where if a sentence with a Q-adverb is true in a small set of time 
intervals (=A′), it automatically follows that it is true in a larger set of time inter-
vals (=A).
Let us see how this constraint rules out the example with a Q-adverb and an 
ILP. Take, for instance, the example in (1b). Its truth condition is given in (27c) 
and visually represented in Figure 1:
(27) a. ＊ Itumo Taro-wa nihonzin-da. (=1b)
 b.  (1b)  g
  =  itumo  g (  C1  g ) (  Taro-wa nihonzin-da  g )
  = λt.∀t′[t′ ≤ t ∧ g(C1)(t′) → Taro is Japanese at t′]
 c. Truth Condition of (1b)
   (1b) is true at t iff for every t′, if t′ is a subinterval of t and C1 is true 
at t′, Taro is Japanese at t′.
Figure 1: Truth Condition of (1b)
In Figure 1, the set A in (26) corresponds to the set consisting of the three time 
intervals, t′1, t′2 and t′3. Take a proper subset A′ consisting of time interval t′1 and 
suppose that the proposition that Taro is Japanese is true at t′1 . From this, we 
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can draw a conclusion that this proposition is also true at t′2 and t′3. The reason 
is that given (18), the predicate nihonzin-da returns the same truth value regard-
less of the time intervals. Therefore, this sentence violates the constraint in (26), 
resulting in its unacceptability. In this way, Percus’s (2007) constraint can rule 
out a sentence with an ILP without reference to bindable variables.
3.4  Illustration
Let us start with the analysis of the sentence with dake under Context A, which 
is repeated below:
(2) a. Context A
   Taro is an international business person and he moves from country to 
country. We are talking about his life in a foreign country and how 
many Japanese people there are around him.
 b. Itumo Taro-dake-ga nihonzin-da.
  always Taro-only-Nom Japanese-Cop
  “Always, only Taro is Japanese.” 
The truth condition of (2b) is given in (28d):
(28) a. Simplified LF of (2b)
  [Itumoc1 [Taro dakec2 -ga nihonzin-da]]
 b. g := [1 → λt. Taro lives in a foreign country at t]
  g := [2 → λx.λt. x is a person around Taro at t]
 c.  (2b)  g
  =  itumo  g (  C1  g ) (  dake  g (  C2  g ) (  Taro  g ) (  nihonzin-da  g ))
  = λt.∀t′[ t′ ≤ t ∧ g (C1) (t′)
  　 → ∀y[g (C2) (y) (t′) ∧ y ≠ Taro → y is not Japanese at t′ ] 
 ∧ ∂ (Taro is Japanese at t′)]
  = λt.∀t′[ t′ ≤ t ∧ Taro lives in a foreign country at t′
  　 → ∀y[y is a person around Taro at t′ ∧ y ≠ Taro → y is not Japa-
nese at t′ ] ∧ ∂(Taro is Japanese at t′)]
 d. Truth Condition of (2b)
   (2b) is defined at t if Taro is Japanese at t. If defined, it is true iff for 
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every t′, if t′ is a subinterval of t and Taro lives in a foreign country 
at t′, then for every y, if y is a person around Taro at t′ and y is not 
Taro, y is not Japanese at t′.
Figure 2: Truth Condition of (2b)
Let us consider whether or not this example violates the constraint in (26). First, 
take a proper subset A′ of A that consists of one time interval t′1 and suppose 
that the proposition Taro-dake-ga nihonzin-da holds at this time interval. From 
this, we cannot draw the conclusion that this proposition holds at t′2 and t′3. The 
reasoning goes as follows.
As shown in (28b), the value of C2 is the set of a person who is around Taro 
at each time interval, and the members of this set can vary across time intervals. 
This means that we take into consideration different individuals at different time 
intervals as depicted in Figure 2. In this situation, if the proposition is true at t′1, 
we cannot conclude that it is also true at other intervals, since a person other 
than Person 1 to Person 3 can be Japanese. Hence, the example in (2b) does not 
violate the constraint in (26) and is correctly predicted to be acceptable under 
the current analysis.
Let us turn to the unacceptable example with dake, which is repeated below:
(3) a. Context B
   Taro got an MBA at an international business school. While he was at 
the school, he shared a house with three students, Alex, Chris and 
Dave. All of them are from the US. They decided to hold a reunion 
every two years after they graduated. They promised not to gather 
when any one of them cannot attend.
 b. ＊ (Dousoukai-o suru toki-wa,) itumo Taro-dake-ga nihonzin-da.
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   reunion-Acc have when-Top, always Taro-DAKE-NOM Japanese-Cop
   “(When they have a reunion,) always only Taro is Japanese.” 
The truth condition of this example is given below:
(29) a. Simplified LF of (3b)
  [Itumoc1 [Taro dakec3 -ga nihonzin-da]]
 b. g := [1 → λt. they hold a reunion at t ]
  g := [3 → λx.λt. x is a person attending a reunion at t]
 c.  (3b)  g 
   =  itumo  g (  C1  g ) (  dake  g (  C3  g ) (  Taro  g ) (  nihonzin-da  g ))
  = λt.∀t′[ t′ ≤ t ∧ g (C1) (t′)
  　 → ∀y[g (C3) (y) (t′) ∧ y ≠ Taro → y is not Japanese at t′ ] ∧ 
∂(Taro is Japanese at t′)]
  = λt.∀t′[ t′ ≤ t ∧ they hold a reunion at t′
  　 → ∀y[y is a person attending a reunion at t′ ∧ y ≠ Taro → y is 
not Japanese at t′ ] ∧ ∂(Taro is Japanese at t′)]
 d. Truth Condition of (3b)
   (3b) is defined at t iff Taro is Japanese at t. If defined, it is true at t iff 
for every t′, if t′ is a subinterval of t and they hold a reunion at t′, 
then for every y, if y is a person attending a reunion at t′ and y is not 
Taro, y is not Japanese at t′.
Figure 3: Truth Condition of (3b)
Let us check whether or not this example violates the constraint in (26). 
Again, take a proper subset A′ of A that consists of one time interval t′1 and sup-
pose that the proposition Taro-dake-ga nihonzin-da holds at this time interval. 
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As shown above, the value of C3 is the set of people attending a reunion. Unlike 
(2b), the members of the set do not vary from time to time. In this case, the 
same individuals, Alex, Chris, and Dave, are relevant as shown in Figure 3. In 
addition, the ILP nihonzin-da denotes a permanent property in the sense of (18). 
Given these facts, we can draw the conclusion that the proposition Taro-dake-ga 
nihonzinda is true at t′2 and t′3 . This example, therefore, violates the constraint 
in (26), resulting in its unacceptability.
The above explanation of the contrast between (2b) and (3b) offers the an-
swer to the question in (4) as follows:
(30) a.  The focus particle dake takes a contextual variable C as its first argu-
ment.
 b.  The value of C can vary across time intervals in appropriate contexts. 
If this value returns a set of different individuals at different time in-
tervals, the focus particle exhibits a rescuing effect. Otherwise, it 
does not.
The proposed analysis predicts that the existence of the expression specifying 
and fixing the value of C should lead to the unacceptability. The example in (31) 
is a case in point:
(31) ＊  Taro, John, sosite Michael-no-nakade, itumo Taro-dake-ga nihonzin-da.
   Taro, John, and Michael-Gen-of, always Taro-only-Nom Japanese-Cop
  “Of Taro, John, and Michael, only Taro is always Japanese.”
In (31), the phrase headed by naka-de specifies and fixes the value of C. Hence, 
in each time interval, we take into consideration the same individuals (John and 
Michael) and check whether or not they are Japanese. Given the predicate nihon-
zin-da denotes a permanent property in the sense of (18), this sentence violates 
the constraint in (26). Therefore, the unacceptability is derived as expected, and 
this example supports the current analysis.
80
e Rescuing Eect of the Focus Particle dake ‘only’
4  Conclusion
This paper addressed the question of why the focus particle dake has a rescuing 
effect in appropriate contexts. I began by demonstrating that Kratzer’s (1995) 
analysis faces two problems in accounting for the data with dake. As an alterna-
tive, I offered an analysis based on three factors: (i) SLPs and ILPs do not differ 
in their argument structure and only the latter denote a kind of constant func-
tion (=(18)), (ii) the focus particle dake takes as it first argument a contextual 
variable C (=(20)), and (iii) Q-adverbs are subject to Percus’s (2007) pragmatic 
constraint (=26). Then, I attributed the difference between (2b) and (3b) to the 
nature of the value of C, thereby answering the question as in (30).
Let me conclude this paper with some brief remarks about an interesting 
question. Does every focus particle have the same rescuing effect as dake? As 
shown below, the answer is “no”:
(32) a.  Focus Particle mo ‘also’
  ＊ Itumo Taro-mo nihonzin-da.
   always Taro-MO Japanese-Cop
   “Always, Taro is also Japanese.
 b.  Focus Particle sae ‘even’
  ＊ Itumo Taro-sae nihonzin-da.
   always Taro-SAE Japanese-Cop
   “Always, even Taro is Japanese.
The unacceptability of these examples indicate that the focus particles mo ‘also’ 
and sae ‘even’ have no rescuing effect. From this observation, we can see that 
there are two types of focus particles. This in turn raises other questions. Why 
are there two types of focus particles? What semantic or pragmatic properties 
divide focus particles into two types? I hope that my future research will reveal 
intricate aspects of focus particles by addressing these questions.
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[Notes]
1) This paper is an extensively revised version of the presentation at the 147th Meet-
ing of the Linguistic Society of Japan held at Kobe City University of Foreign 
Studies on November 23-24, 2013. I would like to thank Eri Tanaka and Sadayuki 
Okada for their helpful comments. Any errors are of course my own.
2) There is another difference between (1b) and (2b): in the latter the particle ga is 
used instead of wa. So, a reader may think that what is crucial here is not dake but 
ga. Consider, however, the examples below:
(i) a. ?? Itumo Taro-ga nihonzin-da.
  always Taro-Nom Japanese-Cop
  “Always, Taro is Japanese.”
 b.   ＊ Taro-wa itumo nihongo-o sit-teiru.
  Taro-Top always Japanese.language-Acc know-TEIRU
  “Taro always knows Japanese.”
 c.  Context: Taro is often asked by a linguist whether or not he knows various 
languages the linguist studies but. . .
  Taro-wa itumo nihongo-dake-o sit-teiru.
  Taro-Top alawys Japanese.language-Acc know-TEIRU
  “Taro always only knows Japanese.”
 The first example is at most marginal to me and if I accept this example, I need a 
strong accent on the subject Taro. This accent leads to the exhaustive interpreta-
tion of Taro, which amounts to the semantic function of dake. In addition, the 
contrast between the latter two examples indicate that dake has a rescuing effect in 
question if it is used in object positions. On the basis of these data, I argue that 
dake plays an important role here.
3) Following many authors, I assume that in the absence of explicit restrictors for Q-
adverbs, they are determined by contextual information. See Rooth (1985) and 
von Fintel (1994) for the relevant discussions.
4) See Kadmon (2001) for the various characteristics of presuppositions.
5) I do not adopt the alternative semantics proposed by Rooth (1985), because dake, 
unlike only, does not use phonological information to determine alternatives.
6) In von Fintel (1994) and Martí (2003), this variable has a complex structure that 
consists of a function variable f and an individual variable x. For simplicity, I as-
sume that the variable does not have this structure. As far as I can see, nothing 
hinges on this choice.
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The Rescuing Effect of the Focus Particle dake ‘only’
 Kenta Mizutani
Since Milsark (1979) and Carlson (1980), it has been well known that pred-
icates in natural languages are classified into two groups: stage-level predicates 
(SLPs) and individual-level predicates (ILPs). The notable difference between 
these predicates is their (in)compatibility with adverbs of quantification (Q-ad-
verbs). Based on this fact, many authors such as Diesing (1992) and Kratzer 
(1995) argue that these predicates have different argument structures. In this 
paper I point out that in appropriate contexts, the focus particle dake ‘only’ res-
cues an otherwise unacceptable sentence with an ILP and a Q-adverb and argue 
that Kratzer’s (1995) analysis faces several problems. As an alternative, I offer an 
analysis in which (i) SLPs and ILPs do not differ in their argument structures but 
only the latter denote a kind of constant function, (ii) the particle dake takes a 
contextual variable C, and (iii) Q-adverbs are subject to the pragmatic constraint 
proposed by Percus (2007). I further argue that the value of C can vary across 
time intervals quantified over by Q-adverbs and this leads to avoid the violation 
of the pragmatic constraint.
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